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"UNDER COLOR OF LAW": CLASSIC AND SCREWS
REVISITED
Dean Alfange, Jr.t
The construction given § 20 [of the Criminal Code] in the Classic case
formulated a rule of law which has become the basis of federal enforcement
in this important field. The rule adopted in that case was formulated after
mature consideration. It should be good for more than one day only.
The Classic case was not the product of hasty action or inadvertence.
It was not out of line with the cases which preceded.
- MR. JUSTIcE DOUGLAS, in Screws v. United States1
A sharp change from this uniform application of seventy years was made
in 1941, but without acknowledgment or indication of awareness of the
revolutionary turnabout from what had been established practice. The
opinion in United States v. Classic . . . accomplished this.
-MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting, in Monroe v. Pape'
INTRODUCTION
It is not altogether unusual for two members of the Supreme Court to
disagree sharply on the wisdom of a decision they have handed down.
Nor is it unusual for Justices to make flatly contradictory statements as
to the effects of a particular decision or its basis in prior judicial rulings.
However, one who has glanced at the above statements of Justices
Douglas and Frankfurter would be entitled to a certain amount of sur-
prise, on turning to the case of United States v. Classic,3 to find that
Justice Frankfurter had joined with the majority in that ruling, while
Justice Douglas had filed a rather vigorous dissenting opinion. These
rather startling reversals of position have clearly not been due to abrupt
changes of heart on the part of the Justices involved, but, instead, have
been occasioned by a great shift in emphasis from what was originally
considered to be the sole vital aspect of the Classic case to another part
of the decision, now seen to be of major significance, but then passed
over almost carelessly by the majority, and overlooked entirely by the
dissenters.
This aspect of Classic was the interpretation given by the Court to
the phrase "under color of... law" appearing in section 20 of the Crimi-
nal Code (now 18 U.S.C. § 242) ' making punishable any acts committed
t See contributors' section, masthead p. 442, for biographical data.
1 325 U.S. 91, 112 (1945).
2 365 U.S. 167, 216-17 (1961).
3 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
4 In 1940, § 20 of the Criminal Code, which was drawn from § 20 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, re-enacted as § 17 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, and which subsequently
appeared as § 5510 of the Revised Statutes, and, in 1940, as 18 U.S.C. § 52, provided:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
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"under color of... law" which served to deprive an individual of rights
"secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States."
In that case, the Court held, without any indication of dissent, that the
phrase rendered the statute applicable, not only to public officers acting
with explicit state authorization, but also to officers whose official acts
might be unauthorized or illegal, but which are, nevertheless, "under
color of law" by virtue of the official capacity of the officer. Four years
later, in Screws v. United States,- two members of the Classic majority,
Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, together with Justice Jackson who
had been appointed to the Court in the intervening period, expressly
repudiated that interpretation, and insisted that the law was only intended
by Congress to make punishable the acts of public officers specifically
sanctioned by a state through "law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom." The Court, however, reaffirmed in Screws the interpretation it
had given in Classic, and did so again, in 1951, in Williams v. United
States,' again over the dissent of Justice Frankfurter, joined this time
by Justices Jackson and Minton.
That this issue still rankles in the mind of Justice Frankfurter be-
came apparent in his recent lone dissent in Monroe v. Pape,' a civil suit
for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 a statute providing for
the civil liability of persons who deprive others of federally guaranteed
rights "under color" of law. This case was brought by a Negro against
thirteen Chicago policemen who, without a search or arrest warrant, al-
legedly broke into his apartment late at night, made him and his wife
stand naked in the living room together with their six children, struck
him and several of the children, ransacked the apartment, and then took
him to the police station where he was held and interrogated for ten
hours without being arraigned. On the basis of the Classic and Screws
decisions, the Court ruled that these acts of the police officers had been
committed "under color of law" even though they were forbidden by
the state of Illinois. Justice Frankfurter, however, refused to concede
Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or
race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
In 1948, this statute was redesignated 18 U.S.C. § 242, without significant alteration.
5 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
6 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
7 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
8 First enacted as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 1871, and subsequently appearing as § 1979
of the Revised Statutes, this provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
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the applicability of these precedents, terming the construction of the
phrase found in these cases "a statutory interpretation which started as
an unexamined assumption on the basis of inapplicable citations and has
the claim of a dogma solely through reiteration."9 Such powerful language
appears to warrant a re-examination of the Classic and Screws decisions,
in an effort to determine their soundness from the standpoint of con-
stitutional and statutory interpretation, and to ascertain whether these
rulings, insofar as they deal with the construction of "under color of
law," are, in fact, so untenable as to merit the biting condemnation hurled
at them by Justice Frankfurter.
UNITED STATES V. CLASSIC
The Classic case was one of the first to be prosecuted by the Civil
Rights Section of the Department of Justice, which had been established
in 1939 by Attorney General Frank Murphy, among other purposes, "to
direct, supervise and conduct prosecutions of violations of the provisions
of the Constitution or Acts of Congress guaranteeing civil rights to in-
dividuals."'" The five defendants, including one Patrick B. Classic, were
election commissioners who supervised the Democratic primary in a
single precinct in New Orleans, Louisiana, in September, 1940. Ironically,
they were members of the reform group that was trying to wrest con-
trol of the Louisiana political machinery from Huey Long, but their
status as "reformers" did not deter them from altering and counting in
favor of their candidate for Congress eighty-three votes which had been
cast for a second candidate and fourteen which had been cast for a third.
Needless to say, Long chose not to tolerate that particular form of cor-
ruption, and successfully urged the United States Attorney in Louisiana
to conduct an investigation. Upon receipt of the report of this investiga-
tion, Attorney General Robert Jackson decided to press the prosecution
of Classic and his associates, primarily to test the vitality of the 1921
decision of the Supreme Court in Newberry v. United States," which had
apparently denied to the federal government all power to regulate pri-
mary elections.' It was the aspect of classic dealing with federal con-
trol of primaries that occupied the attention of the lawyers for the gov-
ernment and the defendants and of the majority of the Supreme Court,
and little heed was paid to the interpretation of section 20 of the Criminal
Code, one of the statutes under which the defendants were indicted.
) 365 U.S. 167, 220-21 (1961).
10 Order of Att'y Gen., No. 3204, Feb. 3, 1939, quoted in Carr, Federal Protection of Civil
Rights 24 (1947).
11 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
12 Carr, supra note 10, at 85-87.
1962]
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In considering the validity of the indictment on review of a district
court decision sustaining a demurrer,13 the Supreme Court was faced
with three main questions: (1) whether the term "elections" in article I,
section 4 of the Constitution was to be read to include primary as well
as general elections, and thus to confer power on Congress to regulate
the conduct of congressional primaries, (2) whether section 19 of the
Criminal Code (now 18 U.S.C. § 241), 11 was applicable to conspiracies
to deprive qualified voters, by means of a dishonest count of the ballots,
of their right to full participation in primaries, and (3) whether section 20
of the Criminal Code, the "under color" statute, could be applied to
officials who fraudulently altered and miscounted ballots in a party
primary. The majority of the Court considered most carefully the first
of these questions, gave somewhat less consideration to the second, and
almost none to the third. The dissenters concerned themselves exclusively
with the second question, except to note their agreement with the ma-
jority on the first. They made no reference at all to the third.
Only seven Justices took part in the Classic decision; the vacancy
caused by the retirement of Justice McReynolds had not yet been filled,
and Chief Justice Hughes took no part in the consideration of the case
because he had been counsel for Newberry before the Supreme Court
twenty years earlier. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice
Stone, who was joined by Justices Roberts, Reed, and Frankfurter. The
dissent was written by Justice Douglas, with whom Justices Black and
Murphy concurred. 5
Neither of the opinions showed the least hesitancy in declaring pri-
maries to be embraced by the constitutional term "elections," although
13 United States v. Classic, 35 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. La. 1940).
14 In 1940, § 19 of the Criminal Code, which was drawn from § 6 of the Enforcement
Act of 1870, and subsequently appeared as § 5508 of the Revised Statutes, and, in 1940, as
18 U.S.C. § 51, provided:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citi-
zen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the
same, or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right
or privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than $5,000 and imprisoned not
more than ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or
place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
In 1948, this statute was redesignated 18 U.S.C. § 241, without significant alteration, except
that the provision establishing future ineligibility for federal office was dropped as "in-
congruous."
15 The dissenters, ironically, were the very members of the Court most interested in the
protection of individual rights, and one of them, as attorney general, had established the
Civil Rights Section within the Department of Justice for the purpose of revitalizing the
few civil-rights laws. Yet, here, in the first major test of the most important of these
statutes undertaken by the Civil Rights Section, he and his colleagues, because of the vague-
ness of the statute, voted to construe it narrowly, and thus to weaken one of the few
potentially effective tools in the hands of the federal government to punish those who might
deprive others of civil rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.
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the majority, because of Newberry, apparently felt constrained to defend
its judgment at some length. More than half of Justice Stone's twenty-
two-page opinion was directed to this point. Once having established
that the constitutional reference encompassed primary elections, it was
but a small step for the Court to establish also that the Constitution
granted a federal right to qualified voters of unfettered participation in
congressional primaries, and that this right was protected by sections 19
and 20 of the Criminal Code. In United States v. Mosley'8 in 1915, the
Supreme Court had held, only one Justice dissenting, that section 19
was applicable to state election officials who conspired to miscount bal-
lots, and thereby injure the rights of voters, in a general election for a
congressional seat. Consequently, since the Court in Classic was de-
ciding that the primary election, as well as the general election, was an
integral part of the process of choice, the expansion of the statute to
cover conspiracies to count primary ballots fraudulently followed almost
of necessity.
It was precisely at this point, however, that the minority in the Classic
case balked. The dissent of Justice Douglas, after establishing initial
agreement with the majority that congressional primaries could con-
stitutionally be regulated by Congress, was devoted entirely to an ex-
planation of his refusal to assent to the extension of section 19 to cover
fraudulent counting of primary ballots. He condemned the statute as
being too vague to establish an adequate standard of criminality, and
while he did not believe that it was unconstitutional on its face because
of vagueness, 17 he did think that it could not be applied to conspiracies
to interfere with the right to vote in primary elections.'8
The minority, however, did not concern itself with the vagueness of
the "under color" statute. The lack of mention of this statute by Justice
Douglas is puzzling and leaves his dissenting opinion curiously incom-
plete. The Court had been called upon to review a district court decision
sustaining the demurrer to two counts of the indictment against Classic
16 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
17 Justice Douglas agreed with the Mosley decision, which sustained an indictment under
§ 19 for a conspiracy to perform the same sort of acts at a general congressional election
that Classic and his co-defendants had been indicted for conspiring to commit at a primary
election. However, he stated that, in Mosley, the Court "went to the verge," but that
its position was "a tenable one, since § 19 originally was part of an Act regulating general
elections." 313 U.S. 299, 334-35.
18 Relying on United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917), in which the Court ruled
that § 19 did not apply to a conspiracy to deprive congressional candidates (rather than
voters, as in Classic) of their right to an honest count of primary ballots, Justice Douglas
declared that, as the statute "was part of a legislative program governing general elections,
not primary elections," it could not be extended to cover the rights of either candidates or
voters in primaries, and that, therefore, he accepted "the unanimous view in the Gradwell
case that § 19 has not by the mere passage of time taken on a new and broadened meaning."
313 U.S. 299, 336.
19621
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-one count alleging violation of section 19 and the second alleging
violation of section 20 of the Criminal Code-and the majority had
ruled that the demurrer should not have been sustained with regard to
either count. Yet the dissent was limited to a discussion of the first count
only, and it is, therefore, impossible to ascertain the view of the minority
as to the second count, although, on its face, section 20 appears to exhibit
the same infirmity as section 19, in that both seek to protect rights which
are only vaguely defined as thc-e "secured or protected by the Con-
stitution and laws of the Unite , .tates."
However, if the minority totally avoided all mention of section 20, the
majority scarcely gave it greater attention, despite the fact that that
statute had only been applied in three previously reported cases, 9 and
that it had never received any authoritative interpretation. The brief dis-
cussion of section 2020 undertaken by the Court took up barely two pages
of its opinion. The Court first pointed out that the phrase "on account of
such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color or race" applied
only to the part of the statute dealing with the subjection of inhabitants
to "different punishments, pains, or penalties," and did not limit the part
dealing with the deprivation of federally guaranteed rights to acts com-
mitted on account of the alienage, color, or race of the victim.21 The in-
terpretation of the phrase "under color of any law" was then settled by
a bare assertion:
The right of the voters at the primary to have their votes counted is,
as we have stated, a right or privilege secured by the Constitution, and to
this § 20 also gives protection. The alleged acts of appellees were com-
mitted in the course of their performance of duties under the Louisiana
statute requiring them to count the ballots, to record the result of the count,
and to certify the result of the election. Misuse of power, possessed by
virtue of state law and made passible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law, is action taken "under color of" state lawY2
[Emphasis added.]
In support of this assertion, the Court merely listed three precedents:
Ex parte Virginia,23 Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,24
19 United States v. Sutherland, 37 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ga. 1940); United States v. Stone,
188 Fed. 836 (D.C.D. Md. 1911); United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1882). A fourth case involved the application of an earlier version of the statute, § 17 of
the Enforcement Act of 1870. This was United States v. Jackson, 26 Fed. Cases 563, No.
15,459 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874), which contained language expressly stating that an unauthorized
act of a state official could not be considered to have been committed "under color of law."
This case was strongly relied on by justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Monroe v. Pape,
supra note 7, at 215-16. See note 92, infra, and the text thereat and following.
20 For the text of § 20 as it appeared in 1940, see supra note 4.
21 313 U.S. 299, 326-27 (1941).
22 Id. at 325-26.
23 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
24 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
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and Hague v. C.I.O. 5 In the first of these, the same Court that was
engaged in whittling down the vitality of the various civil rights acts
passed by Congress between 1866 and 187526 upheld the validity of sec-
tion 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,27 which made it a crime for any
official "charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors"
to exclude qualified persons from service as jurors "on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." A county judge in Virginia
had been indicted for violation of this section of the act, and he and the
state had petitioned for his release on habeas corpus, claiming the un-
constitutionality of the section. The Court, however, only Justices Field
and Clifford dissenting, held that the fifth section of the fourteenth
amendment had empowered Congress to enforce the equal protection
clause of that amendment with appropriate legislation, and that the act
condemning racial discrimination in the selection of jurors was ap-
propriate and, therefore, constitutional. Although section 4 did not con-
tain the phrase "under color of law," it was necessary for the Court to
demonstrate how the fourteenth amendment, which was directed at
states, could give Congress the power to punish individuals. It did so in
this significant dictum:
Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, deprives
another of property, life, or liberty, without due process of law, or denies or
takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional in-
hibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with
the State's power, his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the con-
stitutional prohibition has no meaning. Then the State has clothed one
of its agents with power to annul or to evade it. 28
Thus, the key factor involved in translating individual action into
state action seems here clearly to be the "public position" of the actor,
and the fact that, by virtue of his public position, "he acts in the name
and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power." There is no
suggestion that state action might not be involved if the state official
exceeded his authority or that his acts, even if in violation of a state law,
would be any less "in the name and for the State." Moreover, at the
close of its opinion in this case, the Court, through Justice Strong, in-
25 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
26 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1876). Chief Justice Waite and Justices Miller, Field, and Bradley were all on the Court
from Cruikshank to the Civil Rights Cases. Between Cruikshank and Ex parte Virginia, the
only change on the Court was the replacement of Justice Davis by Justice Harlan. Between
Ex parte Virginia and the Civil Rights Cases, justices Woods, Matthews, Gray, and Blatch-
ford had replaced Justices Clifford, Swayne, Strong, and Hunt. Cf. Harris, The Quest for
Equality 84-94 (1960); Gressman, "The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation," 50
Mich. L. Rev. 1323, 1339-42 (1952).
27 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
28 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
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dicated that even in such cases the official could be punished by the
federal government under the fourteenth amendment. Refusing to con-
sider the discriminatory selection of jurors a judicial act that might
somehow be immune from federal punishment, Justice Strong declared:
But if the selection of jurors could be considered in any case a judicial
act, can the act charged against the petitioner be considered such when he
acted outside of his authority and in direct violation of the spirit of the
State statute? That statute gave him no authority, when selecting jurors,
from whom a panel might be drawn for a circuit court, to exclude all
colored men merely because they were colored. Such an exclusion was not
left within the limits of his discretion. It is idle, therefore, to say that the
act of Congress is unconstitutional because it inflicts penalties upon State
judges for their judicial action. It does no such thing.29
In the Home Telephone case in 1913, the Court undertook a long
explanation of the extent of federal judicial power to redress a grievance
caused by a state violation of the fourteenth amendment. It rejected
unanimously and in no uncertain terms a ruling by a federal district
court that if an action of a municipality or of a municipal official ap-
peared to be in violation of the state constitution as well as the fourteenth
amendment, a federal court could not take jurisdiction in a suit to enjoin
the action until the case had come before the highest court of the state
and that court had ruled that the act was authorized under state law. The
Court ruled, instead, that the fourteenth amendment gave the federal
government considerably more room for action. Speaking for the Court,
Chief Justice White stated that
the settled construction of the Amendment is that it presupposes the pos-
sibility of an abuse by a state officer or representative of the powers pos-
sessed and deals with such a contingency .... That is to say, the theory
of the Amendment is that where an officer or other representative of a
State in the exercise of the authority with which he is clothed misuses the
power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the Amendment, inquiry con-
cerning whether the State has authorized the wrong is irrelevant and the
Federal judicial power is competent to afford redress for the wrong by
dealing with the officer and the result of his exertion of power.
... In other words, the Amendment, looking to the enforcement of the
rights which it guarantees and to the prevention of the wrongs which it
prohibits, proceeds not merely upon the assumption that States acting in
their governmental capacity in a complete sense may do acts which con-
flict with its provisions, but, also conceiving, which was more normally to
be contemplated, that state powers might be abused by those who pos-
sessed them and as a result might be used as the instrument for doing
wrongs, provided against all and every such possible contingency.30
The third case cited by the majority in Classic as precedent for its
29 Id. at 348-49.
30 227 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1913).
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ruling regarding the term "under color of law" was Hague v. C.I.O. The
Court was so badly divided in the Hague case, however, that it becomes
difficult to find a statement expressing the view of the majority on the
scope of federal power to punish state officials whose acts contrary to
state law contravene the federal constitution. No more than two Justices
joined in any opinion in that case, the major stumbling block being the
inability of the Court to decide whether the denial by city officials of
the right of members of a labor union to hold organizational meetings
and to disseminate information regarding the advantages of union mem-
bership under the National Labor Relations Act, was a violation of the
privileges or immunities clause or due process clause. Nevertheless, a
five-two majority of the Court (Justices Frankfurter and Douglas taking
no part) was clearly agreed that the federal courts had jurisdiction
under section 24(14) of the Judicial Code31 to hear a suit brought by the
union members under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes (now 42
U.S.C. § 1983)32 to enjoin the mayor and other officials of Jersey City,
New Jersey, from acting under color of law to deprive them of their
fourteenth amendment rights to free speech and freedom to disseminate
information, even though the evidence demonstrated conclusively that
the restraint of the organizational activities of the union had been "accom-
plished without authority of law and without promptly bringing the per-
sons taken into custody before a judicial officer for hearing.' 31
Thus, although neither Ex parte Virginia nor Home Telephone was
concerned with an interpretation of the phrase "under color of law,"
they clearly indicate that when an official "misuses the power possessed
to do a wrong forbidden by the [Fourteenth] Amendment, inquiry con-
cerning whether the State has authorized the wrong is irrelevant" in
that it "was more normally to be contemplated, that state powers might
be abused by those who possessed them and as a result might be used
as the instrument for doing wrongs." The Court demonstrated no doubt
whatever that the fourteenth amendment empowered the federal govern-
ment to punish those who acted !in the name and for the State" to de-
prive an individual of a federally protected right, even though the illegal
act might not have been authorized by the state, or might even have been
31 Now 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1958), this provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
32 See supra note 8.
33 307 U.S. 496, 505 (1939).
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violative of the state constitution or of state law. Moreover, in the Hague
case, where an "under color of law" statute was directly involved, it
apparently never occurred to any of the Justices participating in the
case that the illegal force and violence used by the Jersey City police to
enforce a municipal licensing ordinance might not have been "under
color of law" because of their illegality. It may be concluded, therefore,
that the simple assertion of Justice Stone in Classic that misuse of state
power was nevertheless to be considered action taken "under color of
law" was not a novel doctrine, contrary to the tenor of previous decisions
of the Court, but, in fact, seemed to be implicit in the previous decisions
he cited. In light of subsequent developments, however, it is unfortunate
that Justice Stone did not see fit to provide a more elaborate defense of
this position.
One decision which Justice Stone might well have cited in defense of
his interpretation of section 20 was Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v.
Bennett.34 This ruling had been recalled in an applicable district court
ruling handed down in 1940, one year prior to Classic. The district court
decision was United States v. Sutherland,35 in which demurrers to three
counts of an indictment charging violation of section 20 of the Criminal
Code by a police officer in Georgia who extorted a confession of theft
from a Negro by means of threats and torture were overruled. The court
ruled that in line with such decisions as Chambers v. Florida,3 6 the co-
ercion of a confession constituted deprivation of liberty without due
process of law, and that the acts of coercion in this case had been com-
mitted by the police officer "under color of state law" inasmuch as he was
"acting under authority of a State law creating the office of policeman
and detective,' ' 7 and since "decisions of the Supreme Court . . .hold
that the action of a duly qualified officer, acting within the scope of his
authority, constitutes State action, even though the particular acts com-
plained of may not be authorized."3 8
The decisions referred to by the district court included Ex parte Vir-
ginia and the Home Telephone case, as well'as the Iowa-Des Moines
National Bank case, in which Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous
Court, gave the same construction to the "under color" phrase that
Justice Stone was later to give in Classic, although no statute specifically
employing the phrase was directly under consideration. Justice Brandeis
declared:
34 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
35 37 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
36 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
37 37 F. Supp. 344, 346 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
38 Ibid.
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But acts done "by virtue of a public position under a State Government...
[and] in the name and for the State," . . are not to be treated as if they
were the acts of private individuals, although in doing them the official acted
contrary to an express command of the state law. When a state official,
acting under color of state authority, invades, in the course of his duties, a
private right secured by the federal Constitution, that right is violated,
even if the state officer not only exceeded his authority but disregarded
special commands of the state law.39
Since 1879, with one significant exception, the Court has consistently
held that the action of state officials, even in violation of state law, con-
stituted state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
The one exception was the 1904 case of Barney v. New York City,4"
in which the Court affirmed a decree of a lower federal court dismissing
for lack of jurisdiction a suit to enjoin completion of a New York City
subway line by a plaintiff who claimed that a change in the construction
plans, made in disregard of a state statute prohibiting such a change,
would deprive him of his property without due process of law. The Court
ruled that since the change was forbidden by state law, the new con-
struction was not state action, and thus the fourteenth amendment did
not empower the federal courts to act. However, within three years, the
Court began hastily to back away from the Barney doctrine, and in
1907, in Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co.,4 the Court held that
even though the state board of equalization had "omitted and ignored"
applicable provisions of the Illinois constitution in levying a particular
tax, the action of the board was still state action. By 1913, in the Home
Telephone case, the Court directly intimated that Barney had been so
attenuated that it was unnecessary to overrule it,42 and it has been
justifiably observed that in that case the Court apparently "administered
the final quietus" to the Barney decision.43
Thus, since the Court's concept of state action under the fourteenth
amendment clearly included acts by state officials unauthorized by or
in violation of state law, section 20 of the Criminal Code could only
have been held to have been inapplicable to such acts if the phrase "un-
der color of law" had been construed to have been decidedly more narrow
than the amendment itself and to have been intended to bar federal
prosecution of state officials whose acts deprived others of federally
protected rights, except when those acts were specifically authorized by
39 284 U.S. 239, 245-46 (1931).
40 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
41 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
42 227 U.S. 278, 294 (1913). Cf. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1960).
43 Isseks, "Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts to Enjoin Unauthorized Action of
State Officials," 40 Harv. L. Rev. 969 (1927).
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law. No reason was suggested to the Court in Classic for applying such
a narrow construction to the phrase.
SCREWS V. UNITED STATES
The immediate effect of the Classic decision was to remove the props
which supported Grovey v. Townsend,44 for, once the primary election
was recognized as an integral part of the electoral process, the myth on
which the Grovey decision was founded, that political parties were private
groups and could thus bar Negroes from participation in primaries with-
out violation of the fifteenth amendment, was destroyed. This effect of
Classic was at once apparent,45 but it seemed to have escaped the atten-
tion of at least one member of the Court, Justice Roberts, the author of
Grovey. He silently concurred in Classic and ultimately raised a lone
voice in protest only in 1944, when the Court, following the logic of
Classic to its inescapable conclusion in Smith v. Allwright,46 expressly
overruled the Grovey decision.
Yet if Justice Roberts had been duped through his tacit concurrence
in Classic,4 7 he was not alone, and this was evidenced in 1945 when, in
the case of Screws v. United States,45 the second principal effect of the
Classic decision became manifest. In Screws, the Court reaffirmed the
interpretation it had given section 20 in Classic, but it did so only over
the vigorous protest, not only of Justice Roberts, but also of Justice
Frankfurter, another member of the Classic majority, in an unsigned dis-
sent in which Justice Jackson also joined.
Screws was one of those unfortunate cases that was disposed of by
the Court to the dissatisfaction of everyone. It grew out of a conviction
for violation of section 20 of a county sheriff in Georgia and two other
police officers who had arrested, handcuffed, and then beaten to death a
Negro man whom they had accused of stealing a tire, and whom they
had sworn to "get." State officials either could not or would not prosecute
them for murder, and, consequently, in an effort to prevent them from
escaping all punishment, the Civil Rights Section took action to bring
about their indictment in a federal court, under sections 19 and 20 and
the general conspiracy statute.49 A demurrer was sustained with regard
to the count charging violation of section 19, but was overruled with
44 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
45 See, e.g., Berry, "United States v. Classic," 1 Nat'l B.J. 149 (1941).
46 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
47 Professor Mason has observed that the other members of the Court felt that Justice
Roberts had been "duped" in concurring in Classic, and that he was aware of their belief.
See Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 616n. (1956).
48 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
49 Criminal Code, § 37, 35 Stat. 1096. Now 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
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regard to the other counts. Screws and the other two defendants were
tried and convicted on the remaining counts, and the conviction was af-
firmed, two-one, by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.50
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Screws, which became the ma-
jority opinion only through the extremely reluctant concurrence of Justice
Rutledge, was written by Justice Douglas, who was joined by Chief Justice
Stone and by Justices Black and Reed. Justice Murphy, who, along with
Justice Black, had concurred in the point of view expressed by Justice
Douglas in Classic, was, in this case at least, willing to resolve his doubts
in favor of the constitutionality of the statute, and prepared an eloquent
dissent arguing for the outright affirmance of the convictions.
Having omitted all reference to section 20 in his Classic dissent, Jus-
tice Douglas was able to consider the statute free from the inhibiting
effect of a former pronouncement of his own on the matter. Yet he was
obviously greatly disturbed by the argument that the statute was too
vague to establish an adequate standard of criminality. However, because
of the obvious desirability of maintaining the existence of a federal
statute that could be used for the protection of constitutional rights, he
was unwilling to declare it unconstitutional. Instead, he stated that it
was valid because it contained the qualification "willfully," and thus could
be applied only to punish those acts "willfully" committed, or, in other
words, committed with "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal
right made definite by decision or other rule of law." 51 But, although the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, it reversed the con-
victions and ordered new trials for Screws and the others because the
trial judge had not expressly instructed the jury that the defendants
could not be found guilty unless they had acted "willfully," with specific
intent to deprive their victim of his constitutional rights.52
If, however, the reversal of the convictions proved unsatisfying to
those who wished to see the effective application of the civil-rights statutes
in police brutality cases of this sort, the Court's interpretation of "under
color of law" proved even more unsatisfying to those, represented on the
Court by Justices Frankfurter, Roberts, and Jackson, who wished to keep
the federal government out of the business of prosecuting individuals,
50 140 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1944).
51 325 U.S. 91, 103.
52 Id. at 106-07. On retrial, Screws and his associates were acquitted, and the requirement
of proving willfulness has come to be a great obstacle to federal prosecutors seeking to
obtain convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the present version of § 20. It may not be dif-
ficult to prove that a policeman who beats a handcuffed prisoner is acting with an evil in-
tent, but the Department of justice has found that it is exceedingly difficult to prove to the
satisfaction of a jury that he is acting with "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal
right made definite by decision or other rule of law." See Shapiro, "Limitations in Prosecuting
Civil Rights Violations," 46 Cornell L.Q. 532 (1961) and "Justice," 5 United States Comm.
on Civ. Rights Report 45-52 (1961).
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even state officials, who have committed essentially state offenses. The
interpretation given by the Court to the phrase was identical with that
given in the Classic case; it was held to apply to the acts of state officials,
committed in the course of official duties even if violative of state law.
Because of the strong objection to this interpretation expressed in the
dissent, the Court gave the point somewhat greater consideration than
it had in Classic. However, the majority saw no reason to alter that
holding. Justice Douglas saw "no warrant for treating the question in
state law terms." Instead, he declared: "The problem is not whether state
law has been violated but whether an inhabitant of a State has been
deprived of a federal right by one who acts under 'color of any law.' "
The Court briefly considered a statement made by Senator Trumbull
during the debate in the Senate over the Civil Rights Act of 1866r4 and
a statement made by Senator Sherman during the debate over the En-
forcement Act of 1870,r5 both of which had been cited by the dissenters
as proof that Congress did not intend the phrase "under color of law"
to refer to unauthorized acts of state officials. However, the Court de-
clared that "those statements in their context are inconclusive on the
precise problem involved in the Classic case and in the present case."156
Justice Douglas concluded:
We are not dealing here with a case where an officer not authorized to act
nevertheless takes action. Here the state officers were authorized to make
an arrest and to take such steps as were necessary to make the arrest
effective. They acted without authority only in the sense that they used
53 325 U.S. 91, 108.
54 If an offense is committed against a colored person simply because he is colored, in
a State where the law affords him the same protection as if he were white, this act
neither has nor was intended to have anything to do with his case, because he has
adequate remedies in the State courts; but if he is discriminated against under color of
State laws because he is colored, then it becomes necessary to interfere for his protection.
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1758 (1866), cited in 325 U.S. 91, 143.
55 In answer to a question as to whether the law would apply to an individual who
prevented a Negro from voting when the Negro was authorized to vote by state law,
Senator Sherman replied:
That is not the case with which we are dealing. I intend to propose an amendment
to present a question of that kind. This bill only proposes to deal with offenses com-
mitted by officers or persons under color of existing State law, under color of existing
State constitutions. No man could be convicted under this bill reported by the Judiciary
Committee unless the denial of the right to vote was done under color or pretense of
State regulation. The whole bill shows that. My honorable friend from California has
not read this bill with his usual care if he does not see that that runs through the
whole of the provisions of the first and second sections of the bill, which simply punish
officers as well as persons for discrimination under color of State laws or constitutions;
and it so provides all the way through.
Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3663 (1870), cited in 325 U.S. 91, 143-44.
56 325 U.S. 91, 111. See Cohen, "The Screws Case: Federal Protection of Negro Rights,"
46 Colum. L. Rev. 94, 95-99 (1946), where the statements of Senator Trumbull and Senator
Sherman are analyzed in context, and it is concluded that both senators were referring only
to the inapplicability of the law to ordinary persons not acting under color of law, and
that neither had any intention of implying that state officers, acting in pursuance of their
official duties, would become immune from punishment under the act if they violated state
law.
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excessive force in making the arrest effective. It is clear that under "color"
of law means under "pretense" of law. Thus acts of officers in the ambit
of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded. Acts of officers who under-
take to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to the
line of their authority or overstep it. If, as suggested, the statute was de-
signed to embrace only action which the State in fact authorized, the words
"under color of any law" were hardly apt words to express the idea.5T
Yet the fundamental reliance of the Court for its interpretation was
the Classic decision, which, the Court declared, was "indistinguishable
from this case so far as 'under color of' state law is concerned," and in
which the question of the proper construction of section 20 "was squarely
involved and squarely met.""8 Justice Douglas argued that since there
was no adequate reason for abandoning the principle of stare decisis, the
Classic ruling had to be controlling.
The argument for a contrary construction of "under color of law,"
which had been entirely overlooked in Classic, was raised and vigorously
defended by the dissenters in Screws. The participation in Classic by
Justices Frankfurter and Roberts was excused on the basis of inatten-
tiveness. The dissent stated: "The truth of the matter is that the focus
of attention in the Classic case was not our present problem, but was
the relation of primaries to the protection of the electoral process under
the United States Constitution," 9 and that section 20 "is now here for
the first time on full consideration as to its meaning and its constitu-
tionality, unembarrassed by preoccupation ... with the more compelling
issue of the power of Congress to control State procedure for the election
of federal officers." '
The dissenters did not directly contest the Court's averment that acts
of state officials contrary to state law nevertheless constituted state ac-
tion within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment; the weight of
precedent was too strong for such a contention. However, the dissent did
try to cast doubt on the validity of the doctrine, stating that it "has had
a fluctuating and dubious history," and recalling that "Barney v. City of
New York, . ..which ruled otherwise, although questioned, has never
been overruled."61 Nevertheless, no serious attempt was made to build
an argument on the aged and infirm Barney ruling, which an earlier Court
had disdained to overrule because of its evident weakness.62 Instead, the
57 325 U.S. 91, 111.
58 Id. at 110.
59 Id. at 147.
60 Id. at 141.
61 Id. at 148. See Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
62 See text accompanying note 42, supra. Cf. Isseks, supra note 43, at 972, where the
author, in a paper which he "prepared for the course on Federal Jurisdiction conducted by
Professor Felix Frankfurter at the Harvard Law School," and in which he stated that he
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dissenters asserted that the error in Classic was the assumption, accepted
"quite needlessly," "that the scope of § 20 was coextensive with the
Fourteenth Amendment."63 They declared:
But assuming unreservedly that conduct such as that now before us,
perpetrated by State officers in flagrant defiance of State law, may be
attributed to the State under the Fourteenth Amendment, this does not
make it action under "color of any law." Section 20 is much narrower than
the power of Congress. Even though Congress might have swept within the
federal criminal law any action that could be deemed within the vast reach
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress did not do so. The presuppositions
of our federal system, the pronouncements of the statesmen who shaped
this legislation, and the normal meaning of language powerfully counsel
against attributing to Congress intrusion into the sphere of criminal law
traditionally and naturally reserved for the States alone. When due ac-
count is taken of the considerations that have heretofore controlled the
political and legal relations between the States and the National Govern-
ment, there is not the slightest warrant in the reason of things for torturing
language plainly designed for nullifying a claim of acting under a State law
that conflicts with the Constitution so as to apply to situations where State
law is in conformity with the Constitution and local misconduct is in un-
disputed violation of that State law. In the absence of clear direction by
Congress we should leave to the States the enforcement of their criminal
law, and not relieve States of the responsibility for vindicating wrongdoing
that is essentially local or weaken the habits of local law enforcement by
tempting reliance on federal authority for an occasional unpleasant task of
local enforcement."
Thus, in Screws, unlike Classic, the Court was called upon to defend
its construction of section 20 against a concerted attack on several grounds
presented by a dissentient minority. It is unfortunate that the Court re-
sponded to this attack primarily in terms of stare decisis, for the minority
was quite justified in contending that the single precedent relied on by
the majority was one in which the problem was settled by an assertion
unsupported by adequate study. As a consequence, sixteen years after
Screws, it was possible for the identical battle to be refought in the
Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, a case involving the civil "under
color" statute in which that phrase concededly was intended to have the
same meaning as in section 20.
The Monroe case is remarkably similar to the Screws case. The dis-
sent of Justice Frankfurter in Monroe is considerably longer, occupying
was "greatly indebted to Professor Frankfurter for suggestions in connection with the
problem herein discussed," declared categorically that:
Whatever may be the merits of the result in the Barney case, the reasoning is un-
mistakably erroneous. The Board of Rapid Transit Commissioners was acting on behalf
of the state of New York. There was state action. State officials did act. Any other
conclusion is a metaphysical denial of the actual facts.
However, see the conflict in the concurring opinions of justice Frankfurter in Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1944), and United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 19, 28 (1960).
63 325 U.S. 91, 147 (1945).
64 Id. at 148-49.
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some fifty pages, but, with the addition of one new argument, it makes
the same points already made in Screws, although in greater detail. The
majority opinion of Justice Douglas in Monroe is devoted almost entirely
to the central question of statutory interpretation, but it again is grounded
largely on stare decisis, except that several lengthy quotations from the
CONG1 ESSIONAL GLOBE are included as a counterbalance to the legisla-
tive history arguments presented in the dissent. Neither in Screws nor in
Monroe did the majority make any endeavor to meet directly the argu-
ments of the dissenters in order to show the untenability of the reasoning
offered in defense of a narrow construction of the statutes.
THE SCREWS AND MONROE DISSENTS: AN ANALYSIS
The Screws dissenters put forward four reasons for refusing to accept
the Classic interpretation of section 20: (1) the Court's "preoccupation"
in Classic, (2) "the pronouncements of the statesmen who shaped this
legislation," (3) "the normal meaning of language," and (4) the "pre-
suppositions of our federal system." In Monroe, Justice Frankfurter re-
peated each of these arguments and added a fifth-that the judicial
history of the "under color" statutes demonstrates conclusively that the
federal courts, prior to Classic, had consistently rejected the construction
given by the Court in that case. However, of all these reasons for ques-
tioning the Classic interpretation, only the first appears soundly based,
and that one does not really militate in favor of the narrow construction
urged by the dissenters.
The Court's "Preoccupation" in Classic
There can be little doubt that the Court had been preoccupied in Classic
and that, despite Justice Douglas's contention that the issue had been
"squarely met," its interpretation of the phrase "under color of law" had
not been carefully considered. The issue in Classic had been the con-
stitutionality of federal regulation of primaries, and that issue was so
dramatic that it had all but obscured the other, and perhaps equally im-
portant, questions raised by the case. The Court was being asked to
overturn a well-known previous decision that had seemingly denied to
Congress the power to regulate primary elections for federal offices, and
it was only natural, therefore, that the predominant concern of the law-
yers preparing the brief for the government should have been with that
question, with only perfunctory attention given to the attendant ques-
tions of statutory interpretation. Moreover, as to section 20, the govern-
ment had scant precedent on which to build a lengthy argument. Prior
to the creation of the Civil Rights Section within the Department of
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Justice, the statute had almost never been applied, 65 and thus the govern-
ment was left with little alternative except to cite the line of cases in
which unauthorized acts of state officials had been declared to have con-
stituted state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment,
and to argue briefly that it saw "no reason why it [§ 20] should be held
to have a narrower scope than the Amendment itself.) 66
Similarly, the Court was forced to center its attention on the question
of primaries; it had undertaken to reject its apparent holding in a cele-
brated case, and, although it was unanimous on this point, it was con-
strained to state its opinion with some care and at some length. Conse-
quently, the bulk of its thought and reasoning was devoted to this issue,
and the problems of statutory interpretation and application were patently
relegated to positions of secondary significance. Some consideration was
given in the opinion of the majority to the applicability of section 19 to
acts depriving citizens of their right to vote in an honest primary election,
but this was necessitated by the dissent, in which it was argued that the
statute was too vague to have such an extended application. However,
no dissent was expressed to the Court's interpretation of section 20, and,
thus, Justice Stone saw no need to offer any defense at all of the con-
struction given to "under color of law."
If the silence of the Classic dissenters on the matter of section 20 was
calculated to allow Justice Stone's interpretation to pass without fanfare
or particular notice, the plan was remarkably successful. Only four Jus-
tices joined in the sole opinion which made any mention of section 20, and
two of these, as it later developed, had clearly been hoodwinked, whether
by design or not. Had Justices Roberts and Frankfurter recognized the
potential usefulness of that statute for the initiation of federal prosecu-
tions in cases involving essentially state offenses, granted their views on
the desirability of noninterference by the federal judiciary in state ad-
ministration of criminal law, it is utterly inconceivable that they could
have acquiesced in the Classic decision.
In fact, once the potentiality of section 20 in cases such as Screws be-
came apparent, these two Justices did not rest with the claim that "under
color of law" had to be given a narrow construction; they insisted that
the entire statute was unconstitutional for vagueness.67 Yet, if this statute
were void on its face, as they argued, then section 19 must be void also,
in that it employs almost identical language in referring to federally pro-
65 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Cf. Rotnem, "Clarifications of the Civil
Rights' Statutes," 2 Bill of Rights Rev. 252 (1942).
66 Brief for Appellant, p. 45, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
67 325 U.S. 91, 149-53 (1945).
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tected rights."" However, in Classic, they had demonstrated no hesitancy
in affirming the constitutionality of section 19, and, on this point, they
could not plead inattentiveness, since the Classic dissenters had vigorously
condemned the extensive application of a vague statute, and had thus
raised the matter directly. Beyond doubt, therefore, if the problem of
the interpretation of section 20 had been "squarely met" in Classic, it
had been "squarely met" by only two members of the Court, Justices
Stone and Reed. Justices Roberts and Frankfurter were busy elsewhere.
"The Pronouncements of the Statesmen who Shaped this Legislation"
The problem remains, however, of determining whether the Court's
interpretation of section 20, admittedly hastily arrived at, is, neverthe-
less, a reasonable one. The interpretation may, of course, be entirely
defensible, even though the Court did not adequately defend it, and,
on examination, this appears to be the case. The three additional reasons
given in the Screws dissent, together with the reason initially discussed
in the Monroe dissent, for the outright rejection of the Classic interpreta-
tion are, at best, insufficient, and certainly do not foreclose all further
argument on the matter, as the Screws dissent seems to assert,69 and as
Justice Frankfurter has reiterated in Monroe.70
Heaviest reliance was placed in both dissents on the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Acts which, it was argued, clearly demonstrates the
narrow range of applicability that Congress intended the "under color
of law" sections of these acts to have. However, the congressional debates
over these acts provide only the most meagre evidence of legislative in-
tent with regard to "under color of law," and whatever evidence may be
gleaned is entirely inconclusive. Since the Screws case brought the judicial
disagreement on this issue into the open, scholars and law clerks alike
have busied themselves poring over the vast number of pages which
comprise the printed record of the debates on these bills,71 only to return
essentially empty-handed. Statements may be found which, out of con-
text, appear to justify either the broad or the narrow construction of
68 This point is made by Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in Screws v. United States,
supra note 67, at 119.
69 See text accompanying note 64, supra.
70 See 365 U.S. 167, 222-23 (1961).
71 For the debates preceding the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which con-
tained the original version of § 20, see Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 211-12
474-81, 497-507, 522-30, 569-78, 594-607, 1115-25, 1151-62, 1262-72, 1290-96, 1755-61, 1801-09,
1832-37 (1866). For the debates preceding the adoption of the Enforcement Act of 1870,
which re-enacted the original version of § 20, see id., 41st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3479-93,
3509-21, 3558-71, 3607-16, 3654-59, 3660-90, 3752-62, 3800-09, 3871-84 (1870). For the
debates preceding the adoption of the Ku Klux Act of 1871, from which was derived 42
U.S.C. § 1983, see id., 42d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 317-22, 329-41, 351-58, 361-401, 408-32, 436-63,
475-92, 508-22, 566-82, 599-610, 645-66, 685-709, 750-52, 754-66, 769-79, 787-95, 798-801,
804-08, 819-31 (1871).
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the phrase, and many of these statements are quoted in the opinions of
the Court and in the dissents.72 Nevertheless, the fact remains that none
of the members of Congress actually discussed the type of situation en-
countered in the Classic, Screws, or Monroe cases, and the topics under
consideration in the quoted passages were always somewhat different.
For example, in the statements by Senators Trumbull and Sherman,
quoted in the Screws dissent and requoted in the Monroe dissent,7 the
purpose of the speaker was to make clear that the "under color of law"
provision was not intended to apply to private individuals. It is not at
all clear that either senator had any intention of implying that a state
official who, in the exercise of his duties, violated a state law (particularly
an unenforced state law), and, in so doing, deprived an individual of a
federally guaranteed right, would automatically be exempt from punish-
ment.74
The statement by Senator Sherman, in particular, would appear to
be a very weak reed for the support of the dissenters' argument. Senator
Sherman declared: "No man could be convicted under this bill reported
by the Judiciary Committee unless the denial of the right to vote was
done under color or pretense of State regulation.' 75 The phrase "or
pretense of State regulation" seems clearly to indicate that a state official,
acting without authority but using his position in such a manner as to
convey the impression of authority, could be punished under what was
to become section 20. However, shortly after quoting this statement in
his Monroe dissent, justice Frankfurter made the following observation:
Certainly the night-time intrusion of the man with a star and a police
revolver is a different phenomenon than the night-time intrusion of a
burglar. The aura of power which a show of authority carries with it has
been created by state government. For this reason the national legislature,
exercising its power to implement the Fourteenth Amendment, might well
attribute responsibility for the intrusion to the State and legislate to pro-
tect against such intrusion. The pretense of authority alone might seem to
Congress sufficient basis for creating an exception to the ordinary rule that
it is to the state tribunals that individuals within a State must look for
redress against other individuals within that State. The same pretense of
authority might suffice to sustain congressional legislation creating the ex-
ception. See Ex parte Virginia ... But until Congress has declared its pur-
pose to shift the ordinary distribution of judicial power for the determina-
tion of causes between co-citizens of a State, this Court should not make the
72 See supra notes 54 and 55. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-85, 195-98, 225-36
(1961).
73 365 U.S. 167, 226-27 (1961). The texts of these statements appear in notes 54 and 55,
supra.
74 See Cohen, supra note 56, at 95-98.
75 .Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3663 (1870), quoted in Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 143 (1945); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 227 (1961), and note 55,
supra.
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shift. Congress has not in § 1979 [42 U.S.C. § 1983] manifested that in-
tention.76 [Emphasis added.]
Senator Sherman's remarks are rather poor evidence that Congress had
not manifested that intention.
From a reading of the congressional debates, it is quite apparent that
the sponsors of the Civil Rights Acts primarily intended the "under color
of law" sections to prevent state officials from executing state laws which
would serve to deprive individuals, notably Negroes, of rights guaranteed
them by the Civil War amendments or other provisions of the Constitu-
tion or federal laws. But since no one mentioned the subject directly, it
is not so apparent whether Congress intended these sections to apply to
state officials whose unconstitutional acts violated state law. As was
conceded in the Screws dissent, the legislation passed by the Reconstruc-
tion Congresses did not manifest a genuine concern for the niceties of
federalism.77 The intent of Congress in the Civil Rights Acts was, in-
controvertibly, to implement the enforcement sections of the Civil War
amendments in order to nullify the Black Codes and to offer the protec-
tion of the federal government to persons whose rights were inadequately
protected by the state governments. Congress did not desire to alter
the balance of the federal system with regard to those states already offer-
ing some form of equal protection to the Negro, but with regard to those
states that would not do so, it was prepared to utilize the full power of
the federal government to force compliance with the spirit of these amend-
ments.78
The Enforcement Act of 1870, which re-enacted the "under color of
law" provision that was to become section 20 of the Criminal Code, was
originally proposed as a measure to enforce the guarantee of voting
rights contained in the fifteenth amendment, although its scope was ex-
panded by amendments to cover enforcement of the fourteenth amend-
76 365 U.S. 167, at 238-39 (1961). Senator Sherman was, of course, referring to the "under
color of law" provision in the criminal statute, not the civil statute; however, no one has
suggested that the phrase was intended to have a different meaning in one statute than in the
other.
77 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 140 (1945). But cf. the dissent of justice Frank-
furter in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 248 (1961), in which he characterized the spirit of
the Reconstruction Congresses as one of "compromise." Compromise is, of course, a relative
concept. The fact that the extreme Radicals could not have their way completely may
indicate a form of compromise, but the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Acts
represent a compromise that could hardly have been reached at any time other than the
Reconstruction era.
78 See Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 210-77 (1908) ; Harris, supra
note 26, at 25-26; James, The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment (1956); Bickel, "The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955). Professor
Harris has declared: "It would be astounding ...if the [fourteenth] amendment had not
been directed at empowering Congress to protect the lives and rights of persons when the
states persistently showed either unwillingness or impotence to do so." Supra note 26 at 41.
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ment as well.7 9 Its purpose, as Senator Sherman put it, was to prevent
"the denial of the right to vote... under color or pretense of State regu-
lation." In other words, its purpose was to require state election officials
to grant suffrage to Negroes, and it would be nonsensical to assume that
its proponents were so concerned with the "presuppositions" of the fed-
eral system that they would have been willing to tolerate subterfuges
that would allow states to circumvent the requirements of the act. Yet
such an assumption is necessary if one is to accept as valid the construc-
tion of the statute that Justice Frankfurter and the other dissenters have
asserted to be clearly demanded by its legislative history, for it would
have been a simple matter for a state to pass a law forbidding racial dis-
crimination by its election officials, and then to ignore the law while its
officials, thus immunized from federal prosecution, proceeded to discrimi-
nate in the most flagrant manner. In fact, since it has been held by the
Supreme Court that the fifteenth amendment was self-executing and
operated to nullify automatically all discriminatory language in provi-
sions of state constitutions and state laws dealing with suffrage (thus
changing a clause enfranchising "every white male citizen" to read
"every male citizen"),80 almost all discriminatory acts of state election
officials have, since the adoption of the fifteenth amendment, been con-
trary to the state constitution or to some state law. Yet surely the "under
color of law" statute was meant to apply to these officials, irrespective of
the illegality of their actions under existing state law.
To be sure, Justice Frankfurter has admitted that state officials could
be punished under "under color of law" statutes, even if their unconsti-
tutional acts had not been authorized by state legislation, so long as it
could be shown that the acts were sanctioned by state custom.8 How-
ever, it is hardly likely that Congress intended to insist on the very diffi-
cult task of proving the existence of a state custom before allowing the
punishment of a state official whose vicious and intentional act, illegal
under state law yet condoned by the state, deprived an individual of a
federally guaranteed right.
In any event, the opponents of the Civil Rights Acts in Congress did
not attack the "under color of law" provisions on the ground that they
could be used for the prosecution of state officials who violated state
law. Instead, they emphasized the potential injustice of subjecting to
punishment a state officer whose only crime might be the faithful execu-
tion of his duties under state law, and the injustice of making such an
79 See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 3660-90, passim (1871).
80 Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); d. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347
(1915).
81 365 U.S. 167, 235 (1961).
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official choose between state pfosecution for failure to comply with state
law and federal prosecution for compliance. 2 This emphasis, of course,
might have been occasioned by an understanding that the "under color
of law" provisions were not intended to apply to officials who violated
state law, but the general tenor of the debates seems to indicate other-
wise. No one pointed out the incongruity of a criminal statute that would
punish an innocent act but would have no application to one that was
patently wrongful. Moreover, the proponents of the Civil Rights Acts
repeatedly stated that the "under color of law" provisions would not be
used to punish state officials who, through some error, innocently and
unwittingly deprived someone of a federal right, but that, where evil
intent was present, the statute would apply. As Representative Lawrence
of Ohio declared: "And if an officer shall intentionally deprive a citizen
of a right, knowing him to be entitled to it, then he is guilty of a willful
wrong which deserves punishment."8 3 Representative Lawrence was
speaking directly of officers who deprived citizens of rights through the
execution of unconstitutional state legislation, but his emphasis, and the
emphasis of the other congressmen of like mind, was on the need to
punish state officials who maliciously abridged individual federal rights,
and not a word appears in the debates to indicate that Congress had any
intention of exempting from punishment those state officials whose un-
constitutional acts, performed in the line of duty, might not have been
expressly authorized by state legislation or by a state custom whose exist-
ence could be proven.
"The Normal Meaning of Language"
The next point made in defense of a narrow construction of the "under
color of law" provisions was that such a construction was required by
"the normal meaning of language." This contention, however, will hardly
bear even superficial scrutiny. As Justice Douglas stated in his opinion
in Screws: "If.. . the statute was designed to embrace only action which
the State in fact authorized, the words 'under color of law' were hardly
apt words to express the idea." 84
The term "under color of" means "under pretense of." This defini-
tion is found, among other places, in Hyamson's Dictionary of English
Phrases, where it is noted that a use of the phrase with that meaning
appeared as early as 1557.85 As early as 1899, the Supreme Court quoted,
82 See, e.g., the remarks of Representative Rogers of New Jersey, Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1120-22 (1866), and Representative Davis of New York, id. at
p. 1265.
83 Id. at p. 1837.
84 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945).
85 Hyamson, Dictionary of English Phrases 93 (1922). The phrase appeared in a poem
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without the slightest suggestion of disa proval, the following passage
from an opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa, adopting the same defi-
nition:
"Color of law" does not mean actual law. "Color," as a modifier, in legal
parlance, means "appearance as distinguished from reality." Color of law
means "mere semblance of legal right." 86
The Iowa court, in turn, had drawn its definitions from Kinney's Law
Dictionary and Glossary,8 7 which, together with the other law diction-
aries of the time, emphasized the identity of "color" and "pretense. 8 8
These sources clearly define the terms "color of office" or "color of
authority," which appear to have been in more common usage at the time
of the Civil Rights Acts than "color of law," as pertaining to "[a]n act
which is done by an officer under the pretence or semblance that it is
within his authority, when in truth it is not,"'89 and there is no reason
for believing that "color" takes on a different meaning when used in con-
junction with "law" rather than with "authority."9 The terms are re-
strictive in that they encompass only acts committed by someone who is
"at least a de facto officer," 91 and not acts committed by one who only
pretends to be an officer, but the lexicographers certainly provide no hint
that the applicability of the terms should be restricted to cases in which
the officer possesses actual authorization for his act. In fact, they plainly
indicate that to exclude unauthorized acts from the scope of the "under
color of law" provisions would be to exclude the very acts to which those
provisions, according to "the normal meaning of language," seem most
directly to refer.
by Sir Thomas Wyatt, "The Lover Lamenteth his Estate with Suit for Grace," which begins:
For want of will in woe I plain,
Under color of soberness.
This poem, although published in 1557, was necessarily written prior to 1542, the date of
Wyatt's death.
86 McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168, 175 (1899). The passage was taken from the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa in State ex rel. West v. Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521,
65 N.W. 818 (1896).
87 Kinney, Law Dictionary and Glossary 166 (1893).
88 See, e.g., 1 Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phases 242 (1879); 1 Rapalje and
Lawrence, Dictionary of American and English Law 230 (1883); 1 Bouvier's Law Dic-
tionary and Concise Encyclopedia 527 (Rawle 8th ed. 1914).
89 1 Abbott, supra note 88, at 242. "Color of authority" has been so interpreted by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 245-46
(1931) (quoted from in text accompanying note 39, supra), and Mosher v. City of Phoenix,
287 U.S. 29, 32 (1932). In Mosher, the Court held that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear
suits commenced against a city by persons deprived of rights secured by the federal con-
stitution, even if the acts of the city were not authorized by the state, for, in such cases,
the city was, nevertheless, "acting under color of state authority." But cf. Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961), where it was held that suits against municipalities were not
authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of the express intention of Congress that the
statute not apply to them.
00 The government brief in Classic argued that "'color of authority' and 'color of law'
are equivalent terms" (Brief for Appellant, p. 45, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299),
and it is, indeed, difficult to see how they might differ.
91 1 Bouvier, supra note 88, at 527.
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The Judicial History of "Under Color of Law"
In his Monroe dissent, Justice Frankfurter raised a point not men-
tioned in the dissent in Screws. He asserted that in Classic the Court
had substituted a novel and indefensible interpretation of the phrase
"under color of law" for the narrow construction which had always been
accepted as correct by judges and litigants alike. He declared:
During the seventy years which followed these enactments, cases in this
Court in which the 'under color' provisions were invoked uniformly in-
volved action taken either in strict pursuance of some specific command of
state law or within the scope of executive discretion in the administration
of state laws. The same is true, with two exceptions, in the lower federal
courts....
A sharp change from this uniform application of seventy years was made
in 1941, but without acknowledgment or indication of awareness of the
revolutionary turnabout from what had been established practice. The
opinion in United States v. Classic... accomplished this.92
This statement, however, is so misleading that it can hardly be looked
upon as anything more than an ill-considered effort to build a plausible
argument from evidence of the most insubstantial sort. In order to have
adequately supported his sweeping contention that the Classic interpre-
tation of "under color of law" represented a "sharp change from this
uniform application of seventy years," it would have been necessary for
him to show that the narrow construction of the provisions had been
definitively accepted, and that it had been repeatedly reaffirmed, "uni-
formly applied," and rigidly adhered to in the seventy-year period prior
to the Classic ruling. That such a demonstration was impossible becomes
manifest from a glance at the cases cited in support of the contention.
92 365 U.S. 167, 212-17 (1961). The two exceptions noted by Justice Frankfurter in the
cases before the lower federal courts were Brawner v. Irvin, 169 Fed. 964 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909),
a police brutality case in which a civil suit under what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was dismissed,
not because of an adverse interpretation of the "under color" provision, but on the ground
that freedom from whipping by a local policeman was not a federally guaranteed right (see
text accompanying note 114, infra), and United States v. Jackson, 26 Fed. Cases 563 (No.
15,459) (C.C.D. Cal. 1874), a criminal case under §§ 16 and 17 of the Enforcement Act of
1870, in which the circuit court categorically stated that "it was not the design of Congress
to prevent or to punish . . . abuse of authority by state officers." Ibid. Justice Frankfurter
also cited a dictum from the opinion of Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cas., 109 U.S.
3, 16 (1883), in which he distinguished the "under color of law" provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 from the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which the Court
was then declaring to be unconstitutional. The "under color of law" provision was con-
stitutional, according to Justice Bradley, since it was "clearly corrective in character, in-
tended to counteract and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings, and customs
having the force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified." Admittedly, this
provision was intended to do what Justice Bradley stated; however, this is not to say that
it might not have been intended to do more and to reach unauthorized acts of state officers
as well. Certainly the Court could not have meant to imply that such a use of the provision
might be unconstitutional, for, only four years prior to its decision in the Civil Rights
Cases, it had specifically held that such unauthorized acts constituted state action within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, and thus settled the question of the constitu-
tionality of the "under color of law" provisions when applied to those acts. See Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
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Justice Frankfurter was able to find exactly one case in which a federal
court had assigned a narrow construction to the phrase, and this was
United States v. Jackson, an obscure 1874 decision of the circuit court
for the district of California,93 the substance of which appears to have
been forgotten by everyone until it was rescued by him from oblivion.
Yet, he unabashedly quoted from this case at great length94 in an attempt
to elevate it to the status of "a dogma solely through reiteration," as he
accused the Court of endeavoring to do with Classic."
Justice Frankfurter was able to demonstrate the absence of a clear-cut
ruling accepting the broad interpretation of the phrase prior to Classic,
but this was not a significant success. The fact is that the "under
color of law" provisions received very little judicial consideration for the
period of approximately seventy years following their enactment. Prior
to the creation of the Civil Rights Section in 1939, the criminal provision
had been involved in only three reported cases,' which attests to nothing
except the extreme reluctance of the federal government to use the
statute as the basis for prosecution. The civil provision, on the other hand,
received somewhat more attention because of its availability for private
litigants who wished to challenge the constitutionality of some state ac-
tion in the federal courts. In footnotes to his Monroe dissent, justice
Frankfurter listed some thirteen cases in which this provision had been
considered by the Supreme Court,9 7 and some thirty-one cases before the
lower federal courts in which it had been involved in the years before
1941.9 These cases, he asserted, "uniformly involved action taken
either in strict pursuance of some specific command of state law or within
the scope of executive discretion in the administration of state laws.1 99
However, closer consideration of these cases reveals some interesting
details.
For the most part, the fact that suits under this provision were brought
against officials who had enforced particular state laws or who had acted
within the authority of their positions was to have been expected since
the provision was a handy vehicle for attacking the constitutionality of
a state law or a state administrative action said to be in violation of the
due process or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Particularly in the period 1870-1940, when the preservation of economic
rights appeared to be the primary concern of the judiciary, and the pro-
93 26 Fed. Cas. 563 (No. 15,459) (C.C.D. Cal. 1874).
94 See supra notes 19 and 92.
95 See text accompanying note 9, supra.
98 See supra note 19.
97 365 U.S. 167, 213 N.N. 19 & 20 (1961).
98 Id. at 214-15n.
99 Id. at 213.
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tection of civil rights was a cause for which the courts evinced little con-
cern, it is hardly surprising that the number of cases in which the uncon-
stitutionality of unauthorized acts of state officials was complained of
was negligible compared to the number of cases in which acts fully au-
thorized by state law were challenged.
Yet, if it had been accepted without question that unauthorized acts
of state officials were totally outside the scope of the "under color of
law" statutes, as Justice Frankfurter implied, the behavior of the plain-
tiffs in many of the cases he cited is quite inexplicable. These plaintiffs
often sought to strengthen their suits by alleging not only that they had
been deprived of federal rights by the authorized acts of the defendant
officials, but also that the officials, in the course of depriving them of their
rights, had acted maliciously and illegally.1'
For example, in Tuchman v. Welch,'' and M. Schandler Bottling Co.
v. Welch,1 2 a zealous county attorney in Shawnee County, Kansas,
sought to enforce the prohibition laws of that state by repeatedly com-
mencing criminal actions against liquor distributors who brought whiskey
and beer into the state and sold it in its original packages, despite the
fact that the Supreme Court had at that time ruled that a state could not
constitutionally prohibit such acts. 03 Malicious prosecution was not sanc-
tioned by the laws of Kansas, nor was any county attorney authorized to
engage in such practice, and, in this respect, the act of a county attorney
who, for the purpose of harassment, causes liquor distributors to be ar-
rested and confined, knowing that they will subsequently be released on
a writ of habeas corpus issued by a federal court, is similar to the act
of a county sheriff who, for a vengeful purpose, unnecessarily beats a
prisoner in the course of an arrest. Nevertheless, the distributors, in
applying for an injunction under the "under color of law" provision,
did not emphasize the point that the attorney was seeking to enforce
the prohibition laws of Kansas, but, instead, chose to stress the illegality
of official harassment. And the federal circuit court, which granted the
injunction under the authority of this provision, clearly indicated that it
felt that the statute applied. Commenting that the attorney was "inviting
an action for malicious prosecution, in which the respondent could take
no shelter behind the state, and for which the state would in no wise be
100 In Hague v. C.I.O., 307 496 (1939) (see text at note 33, supra), one of the cases
cited, the Court agreed that the civil "under color" statute applied in a case in which city
officials bad abridged free speech "without authority of law." Id. at 505. This decision was
one of the three relied on by the Court as precedent for its interpretation of "under color
of law" in Classic.
101 42 Fed. 548 (C.C.D. Kans. 1890).
102 42 Fed. 561 (C.C.D. Kans. 1890).
103 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
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answerable," the court nevertheless declared that he was liable under the
statute because "under color of his office as county attorney" and "in-
stigated by a purpose to harass the petitioner by repeated vexatious
prosecutions," he sought to deprive the distributors of their "personal
liberty" in violation of the fourteenth amendment.1 4 The decision in these
cases is so similar to Classic and Screws that one is at a loss to see how
they can be cited as examples of a "uniform application" from which
Classic was a "revolutionary turnabout."
Moreover, other cases cited by Justice Frankfurter seem to confirm
the pattern. In Wadleigh v. Newhall, °5 the plaintiff sued to recover
damages from a de facto state official who, under color of a California
law providing for the appointment of guardians for minors when deter-
mined by a court to be necessary, had caused his children to be taken
from him and placed in the custody of a legal guardian. The allegations
made against the defendant were rather extensive and were not restricted
to authorized acts. The circuit court totalled charges of twelve felonies
and thirty-nine misdemeanors. 0 6 However, despite this vast number of
illegal and unauthorized acts alleged to have been committed "under color
of law," the circuit court, although it dismissed the suit on other grounds,
said nothing to indicate that the allegations of criminal behavior, if well
founded, would have served to remove the defendant's acts from the
"under color" category, and, thus, to have rendered the statute inap-
plicable. The plaintiff obviously did not believe that his accusations of
criminality destroyed his case, and, if, because of universal judicial ac-
ceptance of the narrow construction of "under color of law," they did,
it is strange that the court should have remained silent on this point.
Nor was judicial acceptance of the narrow construction any more in
evidence in the period immediately preceding Classic. In Mitchell v.
Greenough,07 suit was brought under the civil "under color" provision
and other parts of the Civil Rights Acts against a prosecuting attorney,
a deputy prosecuting attorney, and a judge, who, it was alleged, had
knowingly permitted the use of perjured testimony against the plaintiff
in order to secure his disbarment. The knowing use of perjured testimony
by state officials is hardly an act authorized by state law; therefore, under
the narrow construction of "under color of law," no suit could be brought.
104 42 Fed. 548, 552-53 (C.C.D. Kans. 1890). The temporary injunctions granted in the
Welch cases were later dissolved by the circuit court, not because of any modification of the
court's construction of "under color of law," but because it was subsequently decided that an
action at law for damages was the "proper proceeding for redress," not a suit in equity for an
injunction. See Hemsley v. Myers, 45 Fed. 283 (C.C.D. Kans. 1891).
105 136 Fed. 941 (C.C.D. Cal. 1905).
106 Id. at 949-50.
107 100 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1938).
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Yet the federal court of appeals, while ordering dismissal of the suit, did
so on other grounds, and made no mention at all of a restrictive interpreta-
tion of the phrase, which, in itself, would have been determinative.
In Blackman v. Stone, s a case in which candidates of the Illinois
Communist Party for federal and state offices sued the members of the
State Electoral Board for damages because of the Board's refusal to
allow their names to appear on the ballot, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found it necessary to satisfy itself, not only that the state elec-
tion laws were constitutional, but that the members of the Board had
complied with these laws "in every respect."' 0 9 This latter determination,
however, was, of course, entirely unnecessary if, as Justice Frankfurter
claims, the narrow construction of "under color of law" received "uni-
form application" up until the time of Classic. It is only explicable if
the court had been ignorant of the narrow construction, and had pro-
ceeded on the assumption that acts of state officers in violation of state
law could, nevertheless, be considered to have been committed "under
color of law."
Miller v. Rivers, 1° also cited by Justice Frankfurter, is still another
case which does not seem to support his argument. This case involved
a suit brought by the chairman of the State Highway Board against E. D.
Rivers, the Governor of Georgia. Rivers had attempted to remove the
chairman from office, although he had no authority under state law to do
so. The removal was enjoined by the state courts, but Rivers ignored the
injunction, declared martial law, used military force to take over the
Highway Department, and utilized his power as Governor to pardon
those cited for contempt for disregarding the injunction. The chairman
then brought suit in federal court, asking for an injunction against Rivers
under the civil "under color" statute, on the ground that the Governor,
acting "under color of law," was depriving him of his fourteenth amend-
ment right to due process of law. According to the Frankfurter doctrine,
the federal court would have had no jurisdiction in this case, for the
Governor's action, which had been undertaken in complete disregard of
state law, could not have been held to have been committed "under color
of law," despite the fact that the full military and police power of the
state had been arrayed in its defense. Nevertheless, the court, tacitly re-
jecting its opportunity to apply "uniformly" the narrow construction of
"under color," found no difficulty in issuing the injunction on the basis
of the "under color" statute."'
108 101 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1939).
109 Id. at 503.
110 31 F. Supp. 540 (D.CM.D. Ga. 1940).
ill This decision was subsequently reversed by the court of appeals. See Riyers v. Miller,
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Justice Frankfurter found only two exceptions to his rather question-
able rule that cases in the federal courts involving the "under color"
provisions had only concerned faithful execution of state laws. The first
of these was the Jackson case,"' on which he placed such heavy reliance.
The second was Brawner v. Irvin,118 a case whose facts are very similar
to those in Screws. In Brawner, the chief of police of a Georgia town
arrested a Negro woman whom he accused of having struck a child of
one of his relatives, flogged her with a whip in her yard, and then threw
her into jail for a short time without preferring charges. The woman
sought to persuade the state to prosecute the officer for this assault, but
state officials declined to take action and the grand jury refused to
return an indictment. She thereupon brought suit in federal court under
the civil "under color" statute, but her suit was dismissed on the grounds
that the action of the police chief was not state action (which was directly
contradictory to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Virginia),
and that "the right of an individual to life, liberty, and property, and to
be free from molestation" was a state right, not a federal right, so that
Negroes have to "take their chances with other citizens in the states
where they make their home,"" 4 a contention which has meaning only
if the initial assertion, that the act of the policeman was not state action,
is accepted as valid. However, since this assertion had already been
categorically rejected by the Supreme Court, the entire opinion in the
Brawner case collapses. Therefore, if, as Justice Frankfurter claims, the
narrow construction of "under color of law" had been universally ac-
cepted, it is odd that this judge did not base his dismissal on the incon-
testable ground that the act of the policeman, while constituting state
action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, was not an act
committed "under color of law" within the meaning of the statute. That
he did not is strong evidence that he did not construe the statute in this
way and militates rather heavily against the Frankfurter doctrine.
Justice Frankfurter conceded that in two cases, initiated by the Civil
Rights Section, and decided by the lower federal courts just prior to
Classic,15 it had been held that police brutality was action committed
"under color of law," but he added: "In neither of these two cases does
112 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1940). The reversal was based on the ground that the injunction had
to be dissolved, as the case had become moot following the governor's later decision to
comply with state court rulings. The circuit court took no exception to the substance of
the lower court's ruling.
112 26 Fed. Cas. 563 (No. 15,459) (C.C.D. Cal. 1874).
113 169 Fed. 964 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909).
114 Id. at 966, 968.
115 United States v. Sutherland, 37 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ga. 1940); United States v.
Cowan, an unreported case cited by the government in Brief for Appellant, p. 45, United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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there appear to have been any examination of the legislative history of the
'under color' statutes, nor is any reasoning offered to support the con-
clusion of the courts." 116 However, there does not appear to have been
any examination of the legislative history of the "under color" statutes
in any case before the federal courts prior to Screws. There certainly
was none in the Jackson case, which Justice Frankfurter seems to feel
was the definitive statement made on the subject during the seventy-year
period in question. From a perusal of the cases involving these statutes
which were decided in this period, it may be quite reasonably concluded
that the primary purpose of the statutes, or, at least, the primary purpose
to which the statutes were put, was to prohibit the execution of uncon-
stitutional state laws. However, it strains credulity to attempt to infer
from these cases that unauthorized acts of state officers were excluded
from the scope of the statutes by the phrase "under color of law." Ex-
cept for one isolated instance, the history of the interpretation of this
phrase through all the cases cited in Justice Frankfurter's footnotes17
does not demonstrate that any federal court was aware that the narrow
construction was to be applied, let alone that the courts had given this
construction "uniform application."
The "Presuppositions of Our Federal System"
The remaining reason for the refusal of the dissenting Justices in
Screws and Monroe to accept the Classic interpretation was described in
the Screws dissent as the "presuppositions of our federal system," and
herein lies the key to the judicial attitude underlying these dissents. It
is, of course, not difficult to determine whose "presuppositions" were
being referred to, but such a determination does very little to help an
argument which is based almost exclusively on legislative intent, for the
Reconstruction Congresses, which framed the Civil War amendments and
passed the Civil Rights Acts, certainly did not share the same presup-
positions regarding federalism as the advocates of states' rights. States'
rights doctrines had reached their nadir at that time, and, while the
majority of congressmen, who, after all, were representatives of states,
by no means wished to destroy the federal system, they were, nonethe-
less, dedicated to the task of rearranging power within that system so
that the federal government would be able to take positive action to
prevent the states from directly abridging, or indirectly encouraging the
abridgment of, the civil and political rights of Negroes and other minority
groups.""
16 365 U.S. 167, 215 N.22 (1961).
117 See text accompanying notes 97-99, supra.
11s See note 78, supra, and accompanying text. Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio,
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These presuppositions, thus, were not legislative at all, but were
judicial.1 9 The same judicial attitude that made a mockery of legisla-
tive intent with regard to the privileges or immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment in the Slaughterhouse cases 20 is in evidence in the
arguments for a narrow construction of "under color of law" put forward
in the very name of legislative intent. No one questions the wisdom of
judicial caution in this area; the unwillingness of the federal judiciary
to take upon itself the supervision of every distribution of rights and
privileges undertaken at the state and local levels is, for the most part,
highly salutary. Nevertheless, the wisdom of judicial caution is not an
excuse for judicial inaction. There is an unsettling tendency on the part
of some states and localities to tolerate flagrant abuses of authority by
public officials leading to unconstitutional denials of the rights of in-
dividuals to life and liberty,' and the federal "under color" statutes
clearly authorize criminal punishments or civil remedies for such abuses.
No reason exists for barring the use of these statutes to provide redress
in these instances through an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of
the phrase.
This is particularly true since the only argument available to the
critics of the broad interpretation of the statutes is based on legislative
intent, and not on constitutionality. The constitutionality of includ-
ing abuse of authority by state officials within the concept of state
action embodied in the fourteenth amendment was affirmed in 1879 in
Ex parte Virginia, and has been put beyond challenge by a long series of
Supreme Court decisions since that date.'22 Moreover, the Court in 1879
was keenly aware of the dangers to the presuppositions of i ederalism
contained in the Civil Rights Acts, and had demonstrated its steadfast
determination to safeguard the federal system against congressional in-
one of the most influential members of Congress during the Reconstruction period, and one
of those most active in the drafting of the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights
Acts, answered "God forbid," when it was suggested that this legislation was intended to
eradicate federalism and states' rights. However, he was just as definite in his assertion that
its intent was "to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens
of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the
same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State." See James, supra
note 78, at 107, 129-30, passim.
119 See Flack, supra note 78, at 8, where it is observed: "Those who believe this dual
form of Government best, all things being considered, must thank the Judicial, and not the
Legislative, Department for preserving it."
120 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). For a description of the attitude of the author of this
opinion, see Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court, 1862-1890, 179-86, passim
(1939).
121 In some areas, where allegations of abuse of police authority may prove to have
positive political advantages for the policeman concerned, there is an actual incentive for
atrocity. For example, with regard to the Screws affair, the Civil Rights Commission has
commented: "The episode did not seriously tarnish the reputation of Claude M. Screws. In
1958 he ran for the State Senate and was elected." "Justice," supra note 52 at 9.
122 See text accompanying notes 40-43, supra.
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cursions. Yet even this Court recognized that if the fourteenth amend-
ment was to have any meaning at all, its prohibitions would have to reach
state officials as well as states.
Congress was not blind to the eagerness with which the southern states
sought ways to circumvent the federal civil-rights demands of the Recon-
struction period, and, since the narrow construction of "under color of
law" would have provided a remarkably simple means of circumvention
by allowing any state with the proper laws in its statute books to tolerate,
encourage, and subsidize the violation of its own laws by its own officials,
thus properly immunized from federal prosecution, it is inconceivable
that either the Senate or the House, had the point been directly raised
in the debates preceding the passage of the "under color" provisions,
would have exhibited the remotest intention of so limiting these statutes.
To paraphrase the language of the Court in Ex parte Virginia: "This
must be so, or the [statutory] prohibition has no meaning. Then the
State has clothed one of its agents with power to annul or to evade it."
CONCLUSION
Even the late Professor Zechariah Chafee was invoked in the Monroe
dissent as an opponent of the broad application in the present day of
the remnants of the Civil Rights Acts of the nineteenth century. a The
argument of Professor Chafee in the work there referred to" was that
the existing federal statutes for the protection of civil rights are hope-
lessly inadequate, a point that it is difficult to disagree with, and that
the passage of a comprehensive series of new statutes, grounded on the
authority not only of the fourteenth amendment but also of other pro-
visions of the Constitution, is imperative.125 This is, of course, particu-
larly in the absence of the new legislation, a good deal less than an argu-
ment against the continued application of the old laws in situations in
which their application would be appropriate, and one may question
whether Professor Chafee would have pressed his contention that far.
Undoubtedly, Congress should replace the "under color" statutes with
new enactments drafted with considerably more comprehensiveness and
precision; equally undoubtedly, Congress possesses the authority to
do so. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, as in Classic, Screws, and Mon-
roe, is entirely justified in sanctioning the use of the old statutes in
criminal prosecutions and civil suits against state officers who, in the
course of their duties but in violation of state law, deprive others of
123 365 U.S. 167, 244 (1961).
124 Chafee, "Safeguarding Fundamental Human Rights: The Tasks of States and Nation,"
27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 519 (1959).
125 Id. at 529.
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federal rights. Such application of the statutes is constitutional; there
is no indication that it is contrary to the intent of the Congresses which
passed the acts concerned, and common sense would seem to dictate that
it is squarely in line with congressional intent. The real argument against
the broad construction of "under color of law" is not based on legislative
intent, but is based on the sincere conviction that the course of wisdom
lies in insisting that the states alone should prosecute violators of state
law. No one would contest this argument were it not for the fact that
too many states, notably in cases of police brutality, allow their officers
to violate their laws with impunity.' 2 Where a state promptly prosecutes
such violators, it may properly be contended that the federal govern-
ment should not enter in. Similarly, if federal prosecutions or civil
damage suits are commenced in cases involving nothing more heinous
than excusable administrative error, it would be proper to demand that
the courts use considerable discretion in applying the "under color" pro-
visions. Nevertheless, murder is not excusable; neither is forcible entry
by policemen not in possession of a warrant, especially when the entry
is accompanied by assault. Such acts, when committed by state officers
in line of duty, are proscribed by the "under color" statutes, and, if they
are tolerated by a state, it is a mistaken reverence for the principle of
federalism which prompts the argument that the federal courts should
not intervene.
126 See "Justice," supra note 52, at 5-28.
